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NEW WINE IN OLD BOTTLES: THE 
KIND OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY WE 
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abstract
There isn’t an overall consensus on the aim, meaning and role(s) of contemporary political philosophy. 
The relationship between philosophy and politics has been addressed and sharpened – not just today but 
in different ways and from various, separate and sometimes conflicting perspectives (Leopold & Stears, 
2008). Regardless, the main aims, meaning and role of a field of study are key issues, and the quality and 
credibility of the research will most likely depend on our capacity to draw a path through this conflicting 
background. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to drafting elements of a new road map that could 
lead contemporary political philosophy out of this crippling impasse. It builds on a specific version of 
political theory – Walzer’s interpretation path reviewed (Walzer, 1985) – and addresses a kind of political 
practice able to reconcile political philosophy’s normative commitments – as is the case with the Rawls’ 
four roles of political philosophy (Rawls, 2007) – with its actual ambitions and conditions of achievability 
(Hall, 2015; Galston, 2010). 
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In her work on the differences between political science, political theory, and politics, R. 
Grant (2002) identifies – starting from Berlin’s seemingly critical estimation of the scientific 
project of political philosophy1 – what she calls the “practical and theoretical problem” (p. 
578) inherent in the humanities: political theory would never become a science because 
of the character of the concerns it addresses: normative concerns, which indicate how 
political agents and political institutions should act in the domain of politics. When one 
makes a normative claim, one expresses an evaluation of something; when one evaluates 
something, it is assessed relative to some standards, ideals or possible alternatives. In 
other words, something is, in some respect, better, worse or on a par with some standard, 
ideal, or alternative. Normative questions and concerns contain an element of evaluation 
and ultimately remain – in political theory in general – obstinately philosophical, and 
consequently, their claims cannot be either validated or falsified definitively through any 
scientific method. Grant sees three possible answers to this sort of characterisation: the first 
is simply to accept it because the main aim in the humanities should be not so much about 
acquiring scientific knowledge but to provide a type of educational experience that can be 
inspirational, revelatory, and transformative of our common world. The second response 
posits that some elements of uncertainty are inevitable, even in the most formal sciences; 
therefore, the distance between the so-called “hard” sciences and the “social” sciences 
is smaller than its followers (on both sides) are willing to admit. Both lines of argument, 
Grant continues, have some merit, but they are not sufficient to define the character of 
political theory and its importance for the study of politics. The third possibility, then, is to 
acknowledge that humanities research requires a special defence, a defence on its own terms: 
1  “Nevertheless, attempts made by the philosophes of the eighteenth century to turn philosophy, and particularly 
moral and political philosophy, into an empirical science, into individual and social psychology did not succeed. 
They failed over politics because our political notions are part of our conception of what is to be human, and this is 
not solely a question of fact, as facts are conceived by the natural sciences; nor the product of conscious reflection 
upon the specific discoveries of anthropology or sociology or psychology, although all these are relevant and indeed 
indispensable to an adequate notion of the nature of man in general, or of particular groups of men in particular 
circumstances. Our conscious idea of man – of how men differ from other entities, of what is human and what is not 
human or inhuman – involves the use of some among the basic categories in terms of which we perceive and order 
and interpret data. To analyze the concept of man is to recognize these categories for what they are. To do this is to 
realize that they are categories, that is, that they are not themselves subjects for scientific hypothesis about the data 
which they order” (Berlin, 1999, pp. 162-163).
Introductory 
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the distinctiveness of humanities research, to which political philosophy belongs, has its own 
particular characteristics and should be defended as integrally related to the aims and the 
limits of humanistic inquiry, i.e., the means of interpretation and judgement (or, following 
Grant’s vocabulary, the historical understanding): 
There is nothing arbitrary about the methodological approach [of political theory, 
e.d.]. You cannot discover either what something means or why it matters without 
both interpretation and historical understanding. The characteristic uncertainty, 
disagreement, and lack of closure found in the discourse of humanities are not arbitrary 
either. These characteristics reflect both historical and epistemological realities […]. 
I would suggest that, whereas the sciences are primarily concerned with knowledge 
of cause and effect, the humanities are primarily concerned with understanding of 
meaning and judgment of significance (Grant, 2002, pp. 581-582).
Along the lines of this argument on the political theory’s stance, my aim in this essay is to 
clarify the extent to which reflecting on the relationship between philosophy and politics 
enables us to highlight the unique character of political philosophy. In the first part, I will 
attempt to isolate two main concerns surrounding political philosophy and its issues – 
descriptive and normative concerns – that are covered by three different and sometimes 
conflicting levels of analysis: epistemic, moral, and political. In the second part, I will consider 
the main lines of one of the most compelling efforts to gather concerns and analytical levels: 
Walzer’s attempt to find a connected criticism and to identify what (political philosophers 
as) social critics do and how they go about doing it. Linked to that attempt, my provisional 
conclusion attempts to suggest that the reasons and arguments one can use to blame political 
philosophy are the same that make its unfinished work so necessary today.
To depict the directions in which political philosophy is heading, the first concern may even 
appear to be merely a matter of definition: what is political philosophy, and why does it 
matter?
It is difficult to answer even this question univocally. In one sense, one could say that political 
philosophy is simply a branch, or what we call a subfield, of the field of political science. It 
exists alongside of other areas of political inquiry such as policy studies, comparative politics, 
and international relations. In another sense, political philosophy is something much more 
different than simply a subfield; it appears to be the oldest and most fundamental element of 
political theory. Its purpose is to address, as it were, the fundamental problems, concepts and 
categories that frame and identify the study of politics. In terms of content, political philosophy 
is primarily concerned with questions of freedom, equality, justice and political authority. 
Matters of political authority concern why and to what extent political authority has legitimate 
power over individuals and groups. Do governments derive their authority from the consent 
of the governed? If so, what does that consent look like? Can the state do anything it wants to 
the governed, or are there limits? If there are limits, where do those limits come from? In this 
general sense, we can state that political philosophy investigates whether, on what grounds, and 
to what extent politics and power, or political authority, can be justified. Political philosophy, in 
this regard, will focus on the examination of a series of basic and central questions: 
• What is the nature of justice, freedom, and equality? 
• What is the justification for the authority of a state? 
• How should we envision the relationship between ethics and politics? 
• What is a just society? 
The Old Questions 
(and Socrates’ 
Cold Case)
33
NEW WINE IN OLD BOTTLES: THE KIND OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY WE NEED
• What constitutes a good citizen?
• What is the relationship between order, authority and freedom?
These are a few such questions. Political philosophy can explore these questions, for example, 
through the careful study of classic and contemporary texts in the field and will take the form 
of a broad inquiry of some of these most fundamental topics. Classic philosophical works 
accordingly provide us with the most basic questions that continue to guide the field. We keep 
asking the same questions that were asked by Plato, Machiavelli, John Locke, and others. It 
can be argued that we do not accept their answers, and it is likely that we ultimately do not, 
but their questions are often posed with a type of unrivalled clarity and insight, and their 
doctrines have not simply been refuted, replaced, or historically superseded; they remain, 
in many ways, constitutive of our most basic perspectives and attitudes about the world. 
However, when these old and classic questions – as Rawls specifies in his Lectures on the History 
of Political Philosophy (Rawls, 2007) – are raised in different historical contexts, they can be 
taken in different ways and have been approached by different scholars from different points 
of view according to their political and social worlds, their circumstances and problems 
as they saw them. It is the fact of pluralism that implies that, regardless how impartial 
and altruistic people are, they still disagree in their factual judgements and in religious, 
philosophical and moral doctrines (Freeman, 2014). To understand their works, then, we must 
identify these points of view and how they shape the way the writer’s questions are interpreted 
and discussed. If we go one step further, engaging in political philosophy will therefore mean 
answering questions to which we often do not have safe and sure answers, and we can say that 
political philosophy works as a critical approach in terms of being:
• a commitment to make distinctions between states of the world;
• a commitment to identify criteria for evaluating states of the world;
• a commitment to order the possible states of the world according to some preferred 
principles.
This critical effort drives political philosophy from a first descriptive level to another one: 
political philosophy becomes foremost, then, a normative discipline2 – that is, one concerned 
less with questions about how political life is or was and more with how it should be. The 
primary aim of political philosophy becomes helping those who address it to think more 
deeply about important theoretical concepts and crucial political problems. 
All this is in accordance with the Socratic method. In the Apology, for example, Plato has 
Socrates explaining and justifying himself, his way of life and thinking before a jury of his 
peers: Socrates speaks in a public forum when defending the utility of philosophy for political 
life. At the same time, the Apology demonstrates the vulnerability of political philosophy in 
relation to the city and political power. From its beginnings, philosophy and the city, as well 
as philosophy and political life, have existed in a sort of tension with one another. Socrates is 
charged, as we know, by the city for corrupting the youth and for impiety towards the gods 
(in short, treason), and the Apology puts not merely an individual but, we might say, the idea 
of political philosophy on trial. For the philosopher – as in the case of Socrates and Delphi – it 
is not enough simply to hold a belief on faith but to be able to give a rational and reasoned 
account for one’s belief: its goal, again, is to replace civic faith with rational knowledge. 
2  Even if boundaries are not always clear between descriptive and normative, i.e., between description and 
prediction. See Sen (1980).
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Therefore, philosophy is necessarily at odds with belief and this kind of civic faith. The citizen 
may accept certain beliefs about faith because he or she is attached to a particular kind of 
political order, regime or ideology. However, for the philosopher, this is never enough. The 
philosopher seeks to judge these beliefs by true standards, i.e., what is always and everywhere 
true as a quest for knowledge. 
Thus, there is a necessary and inevitable tension between philosophy and belief, or to put 
it another way, between philosophy and the civic compromises that hold the city together. 
However, even though one might say that Socrates appears to be engaged in a sort of 
highly personal quest for self-perfection (he maintains throughout the entire trial that 
the unexamined life is not worth living), there is also something deeply political about the 
Apology and his teachings that one cannot avoid. At the heart of the dialogue and this speech 
is a dispute with his accusers over the question, which is never stated directly, of who has 
the right to guide the future citizens and statesmen of the city of Athens. Socrates’ defense 
speech, like every Platonic dialogue, is ultimately a dialogue about education: who has the 
right to teach and who has the right to educate the city? This is in many ways the fundamental 
political and philosophical question of all time for Socrates. This is essentially a question of 
who governs or, said otherwise, who should manage, i.e., who should manage disagreements 
that represent the main feature of political life. Socrates intends to put the democracy of 
Athens itself on trial: not only does the Apology force Socrates to defend himself before the 
city of Athens, but Socrates, with his strong critique of democratic practices, puts the city of 
Athens on trial and makes it defend itself before the high court of (his political) philosophy. 
Thus, if we decide to enter the debate on some of the most basic and fundamental merits 
and limits of the study of today’s political philosophy through the Apology, the shifty Plato’s 
reference to Achilles (Plato, 1991, 28c)3 could probably be significantly more revealing than 
the most famous gadflying (Colaiaco, 2001). The latter case is the reference by which the 
philosopher explains his benefaction to the polis as analogous to the good done by a gadfly to 
“a large and well-bred horse, a horse grown sluggish because of its size and in need of being 
roused” (Plato, Ap. 30e-31a). With the Achilles example, Socrates maintains, as he states near 
the end of the defense speech, that the examined life is alone worth living and only those 
engaged in the continual struggle to clarify their thinking and remove sources of contradiction 
and incoherence can be said to live worthwhile lives. The Socratic paradigm of political 
philosophy may reveal some features in common with the older Homeric warrior: Socrates and 
Achilles are paradigms of the tradition – philosophical and heroic in the order – and are two 
connected critical voices within the tradition. In a significant and scarcely examined passage, 
Plato re-reads Homer when Socrates invokes Achilles as an exemplar of the courage he himself 
must display in pursuing his mission: ultimately, he wants to replace military combat with a 
new type of epistemic fight, in which the person with the best argument – the best justified 
argument – is declared victorious. The principle is for the best argument to prevail while 
maintaining one’s position – as Achilles did to protect his friends and comrades – to show 
who one was (at descriptive level), who one is (at descriptive level), and who one should be (at 
normative level). Here, Achille’s aretè – specifically, the soldier’s virtue and courage – becomes 
the most peculiar character of the Socratic methodology and philosophy. The Apology then 
shows Socrates offering a new model of citizenship and a new kind of citizen. As was the case 
3  “This is the way it is, men of Athens, in truth. Wherever someone stations himself, holding that it is best, or 
wherever he is stationed by a ruler, there he must stay and run the risk, as it seems to me, and not take into account 
death or anything else compared to what is shameful” (Plato, Ap. 28c).
Keep Your 
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with Achilles, so is with Socrates: fear of death, or any other punishment, will never induce a 
philosopher to abandon her stance.
My position concerning where political philosophy must begin and what it ought to take 
into account when so doing therefore considers two distinct and equally much-needed 
commitments underlying the meaning and the aims of political philosophy: as we know 
from the Socratic cold case and the constitutive ambiguity of political philosophy – the 
Socratic rational inquiry that even calls the Oracle into question – the analytical ambition 
must always come to terms with the contingency constraint. We saw that we can engage 
in political philosophy in a descriptive and normative way. Political philosophy should 
therefore descriptively remain at a certain distance from political events and contingencies 
to normatively develop appropriate criteria and categories that can make some specific 
difference in politics. The problem, though, is that by placing itself at a certain distance from 
its object in relation to politics, political philosophy may, of course, respond adequately to its 
philosophical commitments and meet the demands of theoretical rigor but appears to be less 
able to honor another commitment, which is also indispensable. Political philosophy appears 
to be less committed to putting categories and criteria into place that make a difference and 
can be useful in politics. 
What I pose here is, therefore, not only a problem of distance, the recurrent trouble of the 
correct distance at which the philosophy must be placed to fruitfully examine politics and its 
contingencies. The problem I am raising concerns how political philosophy, once the gap has 
been exploited with respect to policy and contingency, can claim its usefulness, how it can 
make categories and criteria that it processes relevant while staying away from contingencies 
relevant to politics. Thus, the problem I raise appears to be an epistemic problem and concerns 
how political theory matters today, i.e., the way in which political philosophy should justify 
itself by conceiving or reconstructing the link between its principles that are theoretically 
elaborated, on the one hand, and the politics and its contingencies on the other. The tension 
between philosophy and politics is reformulated in a question of guidance: where must one go 
to engage in political philosophy? I suggest it is at this point where the political philosopher is 
faced with a choice. 
In the Socratic turn, philosophy is a kind of “public service” that constantly demands dialogue, 
which is never a mere theoretical exercise but always a mutual crossing in the context of the 
political exchange that compels the interlocutor to become involved and to be a moral agent 
who has to always give (good) reasons for her positions. In the epistemological account of 
Rawls (Rawls, 2007), political philosophy is tasked – perhaps more modestly – with explaining 
how we know and apply political philosophy’s principles and categories. 
According to Rawls, we can distinguish four roles of political philosophy as part of the public 
culture of every society: practical, guiding, reconciling, and realistically utopian. The practical 
one – the first – aims to find a common and rational ground for political dealings in political 
conflict and disagreement. It focuses on some controversial issues, and – against all odds – 
considers whether it is possible to find some basis for a philosophical and moral agreement or 
at least whether it is possible to limit the existing political divisions to save social cooperation 
based on mutual respect. The idea behind the second role is that reason and thinking (both 
theoretical and practical) should orient individuals and institutions in the conceptual space of 
every possible end. Political philosophy can further help us to reconcile with our comprehensive 
views (see also Rawls, 2005, pp. 10, 40, 144), showing us the reason of the fact of pluralism, its 
benefits, and some political advantages; finally, political philosophy can be realistically utopian, 
i.e.,  it can attempt to create a decent political order and a reasonably just democratic regime.
Now and Around 
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To perform such tasks, political philosophy needs statements of value because of its 
prescriptive or normative attitude. The premise is that political life and institutions are 
not regarded as unchanging and part of the natural order but as potentially open to change 
and therefore as recurrent stances in need of philosophical justification. However, political 
philosophy for Rawls is relevant, especially in times of crisis, where it becomes imperative 
to find and implement some new shared criteria of judgement. It then calls for critical 
clarification of and reflection on the most fundamental terms of our political life and suggests 
new possibilities for the future. Political philosophy exists and only exists in that “zone of 
indeterminacy” between the “is” and the “ought”, between the actual and the ideal,4 which 
is why political philosophy is always and necessarily a potentially disturbing endeavour. 
What is distinctive is its prescriptive or evaluative concern – in short, its concern with how 
political societies should be, how policies and institutions can be justified, and how we and 
our political leaders ought to behave in our public lives. This tension between the best and the 
actual is the only way in which a Rawlsian perspective makes political philosophy possible: in 
an ideal situation, political philosophy would be unnecessary or redundant; it would wither 
away. At the same time, however, the actual cannot prevent philosophy from assessing truths, 
answering questions, and settling disagreements. 
In the wake of Rawls and his four roles of political philosophy, one could be led to believe 
that the difficulty political philosophy faces in expressing its object – politics – comes from 
its tendency to represent it through categories that hide or remove its prevalent content, i.e., 
conflict (of interest, power, and values). To be clear, such a difficulty is not only connected to 
the choice of certain authors; it is rather inherently connected to the functioning and status 
of the Platonic model of political philosophy, where political philosophy is structurally unable 
to consider conflict because it is originally oriented towards the question of order. However, 
if we consider that conflict is not a slag to be eliminated but is rather the irreducible core, 
basis and substance of politics, we should admit that no attempt at giving shape or order to 
politics can dismiss it unless it is possible to completely revamp the political itself. To help 
frame this issue, it is useful to reconsider Michael Walzer’s proposal of a connected criticism 
in political theory. Walzer, like Rawls, sees no way in which the pluralism in politics might 
be avoided and no definitive way to ending the disagreement. However, his reflection on 
the possible positioning of political philosophy starts with this question: where do we have 
to start criticizing? He explicitly refers to the Platonic allegory: the philosophy has to dwell 
in a cave. However, he cannot maintain or claim an external or superior position: “We have 
to start from where we are: I do not mean to deny the reality of the experience of stepping 
back, though I doubt that we can ever step back all the way to nowhere; even when we look 
at the world from somewhere else, we are still looking at the world. We are looking, in fact, at a 
particular world; we may see it with special clarity, but we will not discover anything that is 
not already there” (Walzer, 1987, p. 16).5 This approach suggests that people critically examine 
their own practices, or better, it wants to chronicle and extend patterns of critical arguments 
that already exist. Walzer’s social criticism, in this respect, requires critical distance, but 
this new kind of criticism “does not require us to step back from society as a whole but only 
to step away from certain sorts of power relationships within society. It is not connection 
but authority and domination from which we must distance ourselves” (Walzer, 1987, p. 52). 
4  I owe Salvatore Veca this idea of actuality.
5  On that point, see also Galston (2010, p. 396): “we must begin from where a given political community is” and Hall 
(2015, p. 6): “The basic thought, then, is that we cannot clarify the nature of various political values in any meaningful 
manner before we consider the historical and political question of what their elaboration requires ‘now and around 
here’ […]. I will refer to this idea as the ‘realism constraint’”.
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Walzer conceptualizes the activity of social criticism in a way that puts special emphasis on 
the connection of the critic with the society in which she operates. In Interpretation and Social 
Criticism (1987), Walzer distinguishes between three paths in moral philosophy: discovery, 
invention and interpretation. The first path, discovery, is one where the moral philosopher 
receives her ideas from the outside the communities at which these ideas are directed. The 
classical example of this path is the revelation of the commandments to Moses. The second 
path, invention, starts from the assumption that the rules of human interaction cannot simply 
be discovered – they need to be constructed to guide collectives. The difference in the path 
of discovery is that the moral philosopher makes use of some hypothetical device or thought 
experiment so as to generate principles of justice. Here, Walzer is clearly referencing Rawls: 
the underlying intuition is that no external creator is needed in order to produce rules of 
human interaction; instead, the application of the appropriate method alone will lead to the 
right kind of results. However – and this is a crucial facet of many such hypothetical devices 
and thought experiments – the individuality of those who contribute to the constructive 
process becomes effaced. Individual standpoints disappear in the course of inventing 
principles of justice. Such is the purpose of impartial procedures. The path of invention thus 
accentuates human agency but only to the extent to which it can help generate principles of 
justice that abstract from the individuality of those involved. In the second path, the end is 
given with the morality we hope to invent. Walzer identifies a third path of moral philosophy 
that breaks with both discovery and invention: if discovery and invention are efforts at 
escape in the hope of finding some external and universal standards with which to judge 
moral and political existence, the effort may well be commendable but unnecessary; this is 
the path of interpretation. Moral philosophy as an interpretation conceives of the activity of 
social criticism as embedded in and dependent on society. In the third path, we do not have 
to discover the moral world because we have always lived there. We do not have to invent it 
because it has already been invented. A moral argument in such a setting is interpretive in 
character, closely resembling the work of a lawyer or judge who struggles to find meaning in a 
combination of conflicting laws and precedents. This emphasis on the connectedness of social 
criticism naturally invites doubt about distance: how far should the critic be from society if 
absolute detachment is, in fact, detrimental to her activity? If shared understanding of what is 
valuable in a society is a precondition for effective social criticism, how much commitment to 
these communal values is necessary? Social criticism is an immanent activity and is typically 
considered to be the practice of one who can be detached enough to examine a particular 
society from a vantage point that is “no place in particular” (pp. 5, 16). 
Walzer is correct when he posits that a moral and political world already exists, as a historical 
product, that gives structure to our lives but whose ordinances are always uncertain and in 
need of scrutiny, argument, and commentary. This perspective turns out to be particularly 
useful to proposing a theoretical proposal to fitting “hard and dark times” in politics, to 
thinking about and evaluating answers, solutions, and to finding a way out.
The most important issues of political philosophy so far address the controversial question of 
what justice requires. If now we attempt to take a step in the direction suggested by Walzer, 
at a more normative and political level, we will probably find a new philosophical black list, 
where the stakes are as follows:
• What is injustice? 
• What are the goals of a decent society?
• What constitutes the basis of human dignity?
• What does this imply for our obligations as human beings and citizens?
The New Questions 
(Political 
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• What relationships should we establish among our passions, our subjectivities, our main 
interests, and the rules of public life?
• How much inequality can we live with?
If one looks at our many injustices, what becomes clear is how ordinary and pervasive they 
are. They do not involve only acts of obvious misconduct but also failures of both governments 
and citizens to act when they could. The political philosopher as a connected critic is not 
separate from or outside the society that he or she interrogates and challenges but is rather 
“connected” to it, engaged in its central concerns and passionately, if complicatedly, involved 
in the struggles of the common people. What does this mean for the meaning and the role(s) 
of political philosophy? Can political theory meet the challenges of the present? We now 
know that we need a political philosophy that engages political science without attempting 
to become a science. The best contribution that political philosophy can make to the study of 
its main issues – i.e., political issues, as injustice – depends on its loyalty and commitment to 
philosophical questions as they arise in our political and everyday life. Political philosophy 
as it stands is an imminently practical discipline and field, where the purpose is not simply 
contemplation or reflection alone: it is advice giving. The fact is that the work of political 
philosophy is irreducibly plural and multidimensional, and although we are most familiar 
with the character of a modern democratic regime such as ours, a consistent and distinctive 
conception of political philosophy is, in many ways, a type of immersion into what we 
might today call comparative politics. Regarding this attempt to find a road map to political 
philosophy, it is not justice that brings us to politics but injustice – the avoidance of evil 
rather than the pursuit of good. Heading off evil, not the attempt to realize that an ideal 
condition of justice and fairness, should be the central focus of political thought and action. It 
is also important to realize that philosophy is not without a history; philosophy is a historical 
movement that tackles social and political questions as well as more technical problems of 
logic and epistemology. 
In this brief essay, I did not want so much to propose a theory as to explore and expose 
difficulties in the ways we characteristically think and act when we currently discuss political 
theory in general and political philosophy in particular. I believe that Isaiah Berlin was right: 
political theory will never be a science due to the presence of pluralism and disagreement. 
However, its main weakness could coincide with its primary constructive power, and if we 
refer to Grant’s argument, we might perhaps agree that the fact of disagreement does not 
imply that nothing can be known, only that everything cannot be “between ignorance and 
knowledge, in the realm of judgment, [is] where the humanities reside” (Grant, 2002, p. 
585).6 Therefore, thinking realistically about the audience, the authority, and the position of 
political philosophy could mean attempting to present it as a viable and fruitful method for 
interpreting the political events of our time without removing its philosophical commitments. 
If Nagel is right (Nagel, 2005), the path of justice is a consequence of correctly finding 
6  See also Grant (2002, pp. 589-590): “Every good causal explanation of political phenomena cannot exclude the 
questions of interpretation and judgment that drive political philosophy. Political theory as an enterprise assumes 
that interpretations, conceptual regimes, judgments of significance, and ideas of all kinds are themselves both causes 
and effects. Ideas have significant consequences […]. In other words, the study of politics needs both to seek general 
laws to explain the causes of political behavior and to develop interpretations of the meaning and significance of 
political events and conceptual regimes to inform evaluative judgments of them. Political studies have both scientific 
and humanistic aims. These are distinct but complementary enterprises; the ‘permeability’ does not efface the 
distinction”.
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injustices. The normative constraint of political philosophy involves questions of value, what 
we should do, or what we ought to do when we face a political dilemma. To be concerned with 
finding reasons and justifications to eliminate or reduce injustice are still normative concerns. 
If Walzer is right, we need distinguish the epistemic problem of knowledge and how we come 
to know moral distinctions from the problem of motivation and what moves us to act based 
on moral distinctions. In this sense, political philosophy should take on the responsibility 
over the long term to understand politics and meet the contingencies, ask the right questions, 
find possible and reasonable answers, and contribute to reducing injustices. The “possible-
accessible” is what we call for in political philosophy today: the priority of the actual over the 
possible. The priority of actuality is the only path to any form of possibility in political theory. 
Rooms can be rearranged, as Walzer suggested, and old bottles can be refreshed with new 
wine. Between desirability and feasibility, the purpose could only be to provide some elements 
for a political philosophy that is achievable, i.e., an accessible normative theory starting from 
our actual world. This is not a definition, as Rawls would have said, but just an indication.
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